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Abstract 
We study cartel contracts using data on 18 contract clauses of 109 legal Finnish manu-
facturing cartels. One third of the clauses relate to raising profits; the others deal with 
instability through incentive compatibility, cartel organization, or external threats. Car-
tels use three main approaches to raise profits: Price, market allocation, and specializa-
tion. These appear to be substitutes. Choosing one has implications on how cartels deal 
with instability. Simplifying, we find that large cartels agree on prices, cartels in ho-
mogenous goods industries allocate markets, and small cartels avoid competition 
through specialization.  
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1 Introduction  
For competition policy to be effective, we need to understand how cartels work. To this 
end, it is of first order importance to analyze what issues cartels aim to solve and how. 
Our understanding of cartel organization and operation remains inadequate even though 
it has improved through both in-depth analyses of individual cartels (Genesove and 
Mullin 1998, Asker 2010), game-theoretic modeling of cartel contracts observed in 
some of the recent exposed cartels (Harrington and Skrypacz 2007, 2011) and qualita-
tive analyses of cartel contracts (Harrington 2006). A key factor inhibiting further pro-
gress has been lack of data that would allow a quantitative analysis of cartel contracts: 
that is, how do the contracts look like? Are contracts very similar, or not? What con-
tracting features are used most often? Do some features of contracts appear together 
often? How do the contract features vary with observable cartel and industry character-
istics, and macroeconomic conditions? To address these questions calls for detailed data 
on the contracts of a large number of cartels, operating preferably in a shared institu-
tional environment. We offer such an analysis and provide an anatomy of cartel con-
tracts, i.e., a list of their stylized facts. 
 An anatomy of cartel contracts is important in two ways: First, it provides infor-
mation both to researchers and competition authorities on how different cartels operate, 
possibly helping e.g. in designing where to allocate resources for the detection of car-
tels. Second, it provides a basis for further development of cartel theory along the lines 
initiated by Harrington and Skrypacz (2007, 2011) towards models that are in line with 
such stylized facts. Such models are instrumental in pushing further our understanding 
of how cartels operate, and what types of policies are likely to be effective against them. 
 Cartels have to solve two fundamental issues: How to raise profits?; and, How to 
deal with the inherent instability of the cartel agreement? To better understand how 
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these problems are solved and how the cartel contracts look like, we follow a three-step 
research approach.  
 In the first step, we pin down which kind of contracting approaches cartels use. To 
this end, we resort to the received cartel literature (e.g., Harrington 2006) and economic 
theory to identify 18 potential contract clauses. One third (6) of these clauses relate to 
how the cartel affects the market outcome – raises profits. The remaining two-thirds 
(12) of the clauses relate to the instability of cartels. To systematically analyze these 
remaining clauses, we group them into three economic dimensions: How does the cartel 
seek to solve the incentive compatibility constraint on which economic research has 
very much concentrated?; How does a cartel organize itself and settle internal disputes?; 
and, How does a cartel deal with external threats? We expect cartels to only use those 
dimensions which address problems they can anticipate to emerge and whose benefits 
exceed the costs of including them into the contract. Viewed from this perspective, car-
tels end up economizing on contract completeness and, thereby, following an incom-
plete contracting approach. 
In the second step, we scrutinize how the design of cartel contracts relates to the 
size of the cartel in terms of the number of members and to whether the industry pro-
duces homogenous or differentiated products.1 Our motivation to consider the number 
of cartel members is the attention it has received in the prior literature (see, e.g., Leven-
stein and Suslow, 2006, for a review). In particular, the supergame-models of collusion 
suggest that the incentive compatibility constraint is a function of the number of firms 
in the cartel (industry), with more firms leading to the incentive compatibility condition 
                                                 
1 We also explore how the design of cartel contracts is correlated with other type of industry heterogenei-
ty and the state of the business cycle at the time the cartel is formed. The latter is motivated by the old 
question of whether collusion is more likely to be sustained and initiated during booms or busts (see, e.g., 
Green and Porter 1984, Rotemberg and Saloner 1986, Marquez 1994 and Suslow 2005). 
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being harder to satisfy.2 We focus on product differentiation because almost nothing is 
known empirically about how this industry feature is associated with the organization 
and workings of cartels. Indeed, most of the theoretical literature either studies models 
of homogenous goods, or does not take an explicit stand on product differentiation. 
Moreover, the empirical literature suggests that collusion mostly occurs in homogenous 
goods industries, but the small theoretical literature on the effects of product differentia-
tion on collusion is divided on the issue.3 
In the third step, we provide an exploratory analysis of the complexity and stabil-
ity of cartel contracts. As far as we are aware, the prior literature is largely silent about 
them, but they are potentially important in informing policy (e.g., can relatively simple 
and short contracts sustain collusion?) as well as in furthering the economic theory of 
cartel contracts (e.g., how often are contracts updated?). A notable exception is Taylor 
(2007), who finds little relation between industry characteristics and use of individual 
clauses, or length of the contract. The exception is that he reports that cartels in homog-
enous goods industries use systematically differently some contracting possibilities af-
forded by the National Industrial Recovery Act. 
 To implement this three-step research approach, we have collected detailed infor-
mation on the contracts of 109 Finnish legal manufacturing cartels. These cartels cov-
ered the whole national market and were registered between 1959 and 1988 by a prede-
cessor of the Finnish Competition Authority due to a Finnish law. We use information 
from this Registry to establish which kind of contracting clauses the cartels had adopt-
ed. The strengths of these data are twofold: first, the cartels operated in the same institu-
tional environment, removing one potentially large source of heterogeneity (in con-
                                                 
2 The reason for this is that each firm gets a smaller share of the collusive profits and has also a greater 
incentive to deviate. 
3 For instance, while Chang (1991) and Ross (1992) find that product differentiation makes collusion 
easier, Thomadsen and Rhee (2007) find the opposite. 
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tracts). Second, unlike illegal cartels, legal cartels do not have to worry about the conse-
quences of explicitly writing down their agreements. We can thus “observe an unob-
servable”, i.e. what illegal cartels would write down, if doing so would not have adverse 
legal consequences. Indeed, the very fact that cartels are illegal leads to endogenous 
incompleteness of cartel contracts, because the contracting parties have a strong incen-
tive both to reduce the ability of a legal court to verify the contracted actions and to 
make unverifiable what is observable.4 Bar for this difference, legal and illegal cartels 
have similar incentives to economize on contract completeness in their attempt to coor-
dinate on actions and meet the incentive compatibility constraint.  
 Our analysis of the anatomy of cartel contracts confirms some previous findings 
in the literature and generates a number of new insights. First of all, we find – consistent 
with Harrington (2006), Levenstein and Suslow (2006) and Harrington and Skrzypacz 
(2011) – that cartels coordinate on pricing, allocate the market (and/) or coordinate on 
the positioning in the product space (i.e., who specializes on what). We also find that 
many, but not all, cartels contract on the incentive compatibility constraint, some aspect 
of their internal organization as well as on how to deal with external threats.  
 Looking more closely at the anatomy of the contracts, we find that while essen-
tially all cartels agree on some mechanism to raise joint profits, they differ in how they 
approach this. By and large, we find three basic contracting approaches: cartels agree 
on prices, allocate markets, or use some type of non-competition/specialization clause. 
Further, we find that choosing one of these has implications to the rest of the contract. 
Cartels agreeing on prices do not necessarily use the contract to solve the incentive 
compatibility problem, but agree on organizational issues. Cartels that use allocation of 
                                                 
4 The cartels that we study were legal, but apparently they hardly ever used the legal system to enforce 
their cartel contracts. Thus, there were few reasons at the initial contracting stage to consider the degree 
of verifiability of the various clauses in the court of law. Had there been such reasons, it could have led to 
endogenous contract (in)completeness; see Kvaløy and Olsen (2009), who argue that if the contracting 
parties can manipulate the ability of a legal court to verify contracted actions, verifiability becomes a 
strategic choice variable. 
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markets to raise profits make heavy use of contractual clauses designed to affect the 
incentive compatibility constraint. If cartels use some type of non-
competition/specialization clause they are less likely to have clauses both for incentive 
and for organizational purposes. More generally, it seems that the use of different incen-
tive and organizational clauses go hand in hand: either a cartel uses several (of both) of 
them, or few. Clauses designed to deal with external threats are the least correlated with 
the other clauses.  
 We also find that cartel contract design is related to the size of the cartel and de-
pends on whether the industry produces homogenous or differentiated products. The 
size of the cartel is significantly associated with how the cartel seeks to raise profits: the 
number of cartel members is positively correlated with agreeing on prices, and negative-
ly correlated with using non-competition/specialization clauses. Cartel size is also posi-
tively associated with the use of (more) instability clauses. In contrast to the results on 
cartel size, we find that cartels in homogenous goods industries are more likely to use 
market allocation to raise profits. Clauses relating to the incentive compatibility con-
straint and external threats are also more likely to be used by cartels in homogenous 
goods industries. Furthermore, several of the correlations between how a cartel raises 
profits and how it deals with instability are affected by the number of members and ho-
mogeneity of products. 
Finally, we find some evidence that larger cartels use more complex contracts 
(measured by the number of pages and the number of clauses), as do cartels in indus-
tries with product differentiation. While both pricing and market allocation cartels seem 
to have more complex contracts, pricing cartels also change them more often. Industry 
characteristics beyond the level of product differentiation do not affect contract com-
plexity, but cartels formed in boom years write shorter contracts and have subsequently 
more contract changes. 
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 The rest of the paper is organized as follows: first, we relate our analysis to the 
previous economic literature on cartels and contracts in section 2. The institutional envi-
ronment in which our cartels operated and the 18 contracting clauses on which we have 
collected information are described in section 3. We then proceed in section 4 to explore 
how cartels seek to raise profits and how they address the instability of the cartel ar-
rangement. We extend this analysis in section 5, where we look at how observable car-
tel- and industry characteristics, such as the size of cartels and whether the industry pro-
duces homogenous or differentiated goods, correlate with the design of cartel contracts. 
In section 6, we analyze the complexity and stability of cartel contracts both by relating 
them to observed cartel and industry heterogeneity and through three case studies. Sec-
tion 7 discusses the extent to which our empirical findings generalize. Using less com-
plete data on 902 Finnish legal cartels from the same era, we show therein that manufac-
turing cartels are somewhat different from cartels outside manufacturing: the latter use 
for example market allocation as a way of increasing profits clearly less often than 
manufacturing cartels. Section 8 concludes.   
2 Related literature  
Our paper is at the intersection of two main strands of the economics literature. First, 
our analysis is related to the economics of cartels, in particular the research that ex-
plores their internal workings, organization and specific determinants, such as the num-
ber of cartel members and product differentiation. Second, our analysis has connections 
to the economics of (incomplete) contracts, which for our purposes can be defined to 
include both empirical work on contracts as well as theoretical analyses of incomplete 
contracts and relational contracting.  
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2.1 Internal workings and organization of cartels 
An interesting nascent empirical literature studies the internal workings of a cartel.5 
Genesove and Mullin (1998) study the U.S. sugar cartel by analyzing a rich source of 
information, the documents from the meetings of the cartel.6 Asker (2010) studies the 
operations of a New York-based stamp collector’s cartel and finds that despite their 
very refined operations, the damage they caused was limited. Insightful studies on indi-
vidual cartels, like the ones mentioned, show that there is heterogeneity in both cartel 
design and performance that depend on the environment in which the cartels operate. 
We seek to bridge the gap between a deeper understanding of the detailed workings of 
an individual cartel and the need to observe stylized facts that pertain to a larger sample 
of cartels, both of which are crucial e.g. in designing the right policies. 
 Another strand of the empirical cartel literature studies samples of cartels. Suslow 
(2005) studies the relation between formal cartel contracts and the structure and durabil-
ity of cartels using a sample of legal cartels, finding that uncertainty in the operating 
environment is inversely related to the stability of cartels. Taylor (2007) analyses the 
cartel codes from the National Industrial Recovery Act for cartels registering between 
1933 and 1935 in the US and finds that high complexity of cartel codes (contracts) were 
correlated with slower output growth, indicating that cartels were successful in restrain-
ing output. He also briefly touches on the determinants of cartel contracts; we will 
comment on this part of his work in section 7. Levenstein and Suslow (2011) are closer 
to us in having collected information on the contract characteristics of cartels; in their 
case, of a relatively large sample of illegal international cartels. Instead of analyzing 
those characteristics, they, as Taylor (2007), consider them as determinants of cartel 
                                                 
5 A much larger literature studies the behavior of individual cartels. Prominent examples are Pesendorfer 
(2000), Porter and Zona (1993, 1999) and Röller and Steen (2006). 
6 Genesove and Mullin find in particular that the cartel resorted to negotiations in the face of contract 
violations rather than (directly) going for a punishment (e.g. price war). The cartel also came up with 
contractual remedies to the problems that surfaced. 
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duration.7 We contribute to this literature by bringing new data on legal cartels that 
share a common institutional environment, to bear on a new aspect of the phenomenon, 
namely cartel contract anatomy. 
 Harrington and Skrypacz (2007, 2011), while studying cartel contracts, offer a 
different approach. They build a theoretical model, derive an equilibrium whose proper-
ties match qualitatively the key dimensions of observed cartel agreements in certain 
markets and show under what conditions an equilibrium with those properties exists. 
Our aim is to advance this literature by providing a deeper analysis of cartel contracts 
than has been possible hereto-fore, thereby providing more (and more robust) stylized 
facts that need to be explained and understood. One could, for example, use our results 
to first build a model that in equilibrium delivers the type of cartel contract observed in 
our data under the assumption that there is no competition authority. The environment 
can thereafter be changed (by, e.g., introducing a competition authority, modelled as a 
detection probability and an associated fine) to study what type of a cartel agreement 
arises in the new equilibrium. Viewed from this point, Harrington and Skrypacz model a 
legal cartel, or tacit collusion, rather than an illegal cartel, as their model does not in-
clude a competition authority. 
The received theoretical literature suggests that cartel formation and stability 
should typically be inversely related to the number of market participants and cartel 
members, but empirically that seems not to always be the case (Levenstein and Suslow, 
2006). Even less is known about how product differentiation is associated with the or-
ganization and workings of cartels. The empirical literature does suggest that collusion 
mostly occurs in homogenous goods industries (see e.g., Levenstein and Suslow, 2006), 
but the theoretical literature addressing the same question portray a more mixed picture. 
                                                 
7 See also the earlier literature consisting that includes among others Frass and Greer (1977), Hay and 
Kelley (1974) and Posner (1970). 
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Chang (1991), studying collusion in a Hotelling model, and Ross (1992), studying two 
different models of product differentiation, find that differentiation makes collusion 
easier, while Raith (1996) and Häckner (1994) find the opposite. In early papers, De-
neckere (1983) and Majerus (1988) study the related question of whether collusion is 
easier to sustain with price or quantity competition in a differentiated goods market 
when collusion yields monopoly profits. Deneckere finds that for complements and very 
close substitutes, collusion is easier (the minimum discount factor lower) with price 
than with quantity competition. For moderate to poor substitutes, the situation is re-
versed. Majerus finds that price competition is (weakly) more efficient (and hence col-
lusion harder) than quantity competition. Rotschild (1992) also combines the analysis of 
product differentiation with an analysis of price versus quantity setting. He finds that 
with price setting, product differentiation makes cartels less stable, while the opposite is 
true with quantity setting. Lambertini and Schultz (2003) generalize the analysis by al-
lowing for lower than monopoly profits due to collusion and find that for substitutes 
(complements), profits are maximized by choosing quantities (prices) in the collusive 
phase.8 
2.2 Economic analysis of (incomplete) contracts 
Our research has connections to the empirical work on contracts. Lerner and Merges 
(1998) study the allocation of control rights in alliances between US bio-technology 
companies and firms sponsoring them financially. Chiappori and Salanie (2000) use 
French insurance data to test for the existence of asymmetric information in contractual 
relationships. Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) explore the econometric consequences of 
endogenous matching in the context of a contracting relationship using historical Italian 
                                                 
8 In more recent work Schultz (2005) studies the effect of market transparency on collusion in a Hotelling 
model and shows that an increase in transparency makes collusion harder with product differentiation, but 
that the effect disappears when goods become homogenous. Thomadsen and Rhee (2007) study how the 
effect of product differentiation on collusion is affected by costs of maintaining collusion (e.g., monitor-
ing, communication, negotiations). Thomadsen and Rhee show that such costs increase the difficulty of 
sustaining collusion more for firms in industries with product differentiation. 
 11 
data on contracts between landlords and tenants. Finally, in a paper that is close in spirit 
to ours, Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) use venture capital contracts in the US to investi-
gate how well their dimensions map to the predictions of financial contracting theory. A 
difference between our paper and theirs is that while they could confront their empirical 
regularities with a rich theoretical literature on financial contracting, the existing theo-
retical literature on cartel contracts is rather thin. As a substitute, the existing theoretical 
literature on cartel performance is rich. 
 When outlawed, cartels have to rely on self-enforcing relational contracts, i.e., 
they cannot rely on contracts that require court enforcement. However, even illegal car-
tels have to agree explicitly at least on something, as otherwise collusion would just be 
tacit. That is, illegal cartels have to explicitly outline which contract dimensions their 
formal collusive contract includes and, due to the ensuing greater verifiability of intend-
ed actions, face the associated increases in the risk of being exposed in future and hav-
ing to possibly pay penalties and damages. Alternatively, a cartel needs to deliberate on 
the same issues and just informally agree on how a cartel contract would look like, if it 
was actually written. In either case, the theory of endogenously incomplete contracts 
suggests that like legal cartels, illegal cartels are likely to make use of (only) those con-
tract dimensions whose benefits exceed the costs of including them into the (actual or 
virtual) contract. The benefits are related to the increased collusive profits and greater 
stability (see Harrington and Skrypacz 2007, 2011), whereas the costs can be cognitive 
(Tirole 2009), informational (Spier 1992) or plain ink costs (e.g. Dye 1985, Anderlini 
and Felli 1994, Battigalli and Maggi 2002, 2008), or some combination of the three. 
The theory also predicts that if cartel contracts fall into the category of incomplete con-
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tracts, cartels should mostly agree on control rights, discretion and decision-making 
rules (Bolton and Dewatripont 2004, pp. 37).9 
3 The institutional environment and data 
This section describes both the institutional environment in which our cartels operated, 
our sources of data, and the 18 contracting clauses on which our analysis builds. 
3.1 The institutional environment 
The development of Finnish competition policy after the Second World War follows 
closely developments in other European countries, and Sweden in particular. In practice, 
there was no competition policy before the war (see Fellman 2008). After the war, a 
committee was set up in 1948 to draft a framework for competition legislation. This 
work resulted in the first cartel law which took effect in 1958. The central idea was to 
collect information on rather than deter collusive activities. For this purpose, a (prede-
cessor of the) Finnish competition authority (CA) was set up and given the task to regis-
ter cartels.  
 The CA was active, sending out thousands of inquiries and registering several 
hundred cartels in the first three years of its operation. Registration in the Registry was 
contingent on the CA contacting the cartel. This changed in 1964 when the law was 
revised. Now cartels with a formal organization (such as an association) had to register. 
In 1973 the registration requirements were again somewhat tightened.  It was only in the 
1980s that Finland finally edged towards a modern competition law, as the work of a 
committee established in 1985 resulted in a new law taking effect in 1988. This law 
                                                 
9 The theory that treats the completeness of contracts as endogenous has not yet settled on key determi-
nants; see, e.g., Bolton and Dewatripont (2004) for a textbook treatment and Tirole (2009) and Kvaløy 
and Olsen (2009) for some more recent advances. 
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made void possible sanctions in cartel agreements. Cartels became illegal only in the 
beginning of 1993.10 
 Our understanding of the past regime, based on written accounts and discussions 
with people familiar with the era, is that the costs of registering were minor. There were 
costs of not registering; in particular, not registering could have made enforcement of 
the contract more difficult, though taking contract breaches to the court was very rare, if 
not effectively non-existent.11  It also seems that there were other benefits tied with reg-
istering. The former and current Director Generals of the Finnish CA (Purasjoki and 
Jokinen, 2001) sum up the environment prior to the 1988 law: “Time was such that 
there seemed no need to intervene even in clear-cut cases, especially if they had been 
registered. Registration had been transformed into a sign of acceptability of the [cartel] 
agreement, at least for the parties involved [in the cartel]”. 
3.2 Data sources 
Our data consist of information on cartel contracts, industrial statistics and macroeco-
nomic variables. They come from three sources.  
 All the data on cartel contracts is based on archive work in the Registry. For each 
registered cartel, the Registry established a folder, and gave an identification number. 
The folder contains all the correspondence between the Registry and the cartel. The 
Registry also always asked for the actual cartel contract. Once a cartel was registered, 
basic information on it was published in the Official Journal of the Finnish government. 
Thus, the Registry (in a somewhat limited way, given the small circulation of the Jour-
nal) made cartels public. All our data on the contracts and cartels are based on the in-
formation available in the Registry. 
                                                 
10 In the Appendix we provide graphs of the rate of Registry entries and exits, and of the cumulative 
number of entries and exits. 
11 We have interviewed people with a long working history in the Finnish Competition Authority. They 
could recall one case from the early 1980s. According to Juhani Jokinen (private exchange), this case lead 
to the law change in 1988 making sanctions in cartel contracts void. 
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 The Registry contains a total of some 900 cartels. As archive work is time con-
suming and expensive, we could not include all of them in our sample as the objective 
was to collect detailed information on each of the cartel contracts we include in our 
sample. We decided to concentrate on nationwide manufacturing cartels, and chose to 
include the first cartel(s) in a given (3-digit) industry. This resulted in us going through 
the folders of 109 cartels in a very detailed (and time-consuming) way.  
 We used a semi-structured approach to collect information on 18 potential con-
tract clauses. After initial discussions of how to interpret contracts, we first randomly 
chose eight cartels and had four researchers go through each of them independently. We 
then checked for any differences in interpretation, and decided on a common approach. 
We thereafter followed a written protocol with the 109 cartel contracts. We will discuss 
the 18 clauses and other information we collected shortly. In addition to this infor-
mation on contract clauses we collected information on the length (in pages) of the con-
tract, the number of contract changes and the number of members in the cartel. 
To this data we have matched 4-digit industry statistics from Statistics Finland. In 
doing so we needed to decide what year’s industrial statistics to match. We use the sta-
tistics of the year prior to registration. To measure product differentiation we have con-
structed an index (homogenous_d) that indicates whether an industry primarily produces 
homogenous goods (=1) or not (=0). We followed the existing literature (Rauch 1999, 
Foster, Haltiwanger, Syverson 2008) and studied the characterization of each 4-digit 
industry, and the description of the goods produced by the cartel devised by the Registry 
to determine whether the cartel was producing homogenous goods or not.12 Finally, our 
source for macroeconomic variables is the database of the Research Institute of the 
                                                 
12 To give a couple of examples, the cartel producing cardboard was classified as a homogenous goods 
cartel, while the cartel producing dairy products was classified as producing differentiated goods. We 
sought to be conservative in classifying an industry (cartel) to produce homogenous goods. An inspection 
of the industries and the classification suggests that many of the industries we classified as producing 
homogenous goods are upstream industries selling to other firms rather than directly to consumers. 
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Finnish Economy (ETLA). We describe the industry- and macrovariables in greater 
detail in section 5, where we condition the design of cartel contracts on them.  
3.3 The economic dimensions of the cartel contracts 
We collected information on 18 potential contract clauses, basing our work on Harring-
ton (2006) and economic theory. One third of these contract clauses relate to how the 
cartel affects the market outcome – raise profits. The remaining two thirds relate to car-
tel instability. To systematically analyze these latter 12 clauses we group them further 
into to three economic dimensions. 
 This leaves us with four economic dimensions: i) market power attributes (MPA), 
which describe what a cartel agrees upon to increases its profits, and three instability 
dimensions; ii) the incentive compatibility constraint (ICC), which is about the different 
contractual ways of dealing with incentive compatibility; iii) the internal cartel organi-
zation (ICO) of the cartel, and iv) the external cartel contract (ECC), which is about 
dealing with external threats.  
 In what follows, we give brief descriptions of the 18 contract clauses and describe 
the economic dimensions of cartel contracts to which they match.  
MPA – Market Power Attributes 
Six of 18 contract clauses have to do with MPA and thus how the cartel coordinates its 
actions to increase profits. This category includes the following measures: Pricing, 
Market allocation, Efficiency, Technology, Non-price clauses and Non-
competition/specialization. The first one, Pricing, takes the value one if the contract 
mentions agreements on prices, pricing rules, discount rules and/or rules of delivery and 
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payment.13 The Market allocation variable takes the value one if the contract specifies 
sales quotas or market shares, the cartel uses exclusive territories, or the contract allo-
cates customers among the members. It takes the value one also if the contract stipulates 
that the members follow a “home-market principle”, i.e., they refrain from entering each 
other’s (geographic) “home” markets.14 The variable Efficiency takes on the value one if 
the contract has a section stipulating that sales and/or production should be allocated 
according to efficiency. As an example, some contracts stipulate that the member whose 
facility is closest to a given customer should deliver the goods. Technology in turn takes 
value one in the case the contract has a clause about sharing of technological knowledge 
(such as patents or blueprints). The Non-price clauses -variable is given the value one if 
the contract mentions any non-price restrictions.15 These include things like add-ons, 
bundling, and quality. Finally, the Non-competition/specialization variable takes the 
value one if the contract stipulates that the members are to specialize in one way or the 
other, as well as if the cartel members simply agree to “not compete” in a given mar-
ket.16  
 The difference between a cartel having the Non-competition clause and having the 
Market allocation clause is that the former includes the parties agreeing e.g. on parti-
                                                 
13 Pricing takes the value one if the cartel agrees on any of the following: Price, pricing rule, discounts, 
terms of delivery. Of the 63 contracts that use Pricing, 78% agree on price, 10% specify a pricing rule, 
50% rules on discounts, and 48% terms of delivery. These clauses turn out to be mostly substitutes: All 
other correlations but that between discount rules and terms of delivery (0.33, p-value 0.01) are negative. 
Only two however are statistically significant. Price and pricing rule have a correlation of -0.61 (p-value 
0.00) and discounts and pricing rule a correlation of -0.21 (0.10). 
14 Sales quotas are used by 66% of the 29 (27% of) cartels using Market allocation, territories by 28% 
and the home-market principle by 10%. With only 29 cartels using Market allocation, an analysis of cor-
relations is at best suggestive: Keeping that in mind we find that all correlations are negative and large in 
absolute value: -0.21 (the home-market principle and territories), -0.47 (sales quotas and the home market 
principle) and -0.69 (sales quotas and territories), and all but that of the home-market principle and terri-
tories statistically significant. 
15 We also collected qualitative evidence information on the MPA contract clause Non-price. We didn’t 
find much, and the most frequent were different ways of minimizing product differentiation. For example, 
cartels could agree on standardizing products, or packages. 
16Non-competition/specialization was used by 42 (39% of) cartels. The two parts of this clause, a non-
competition clause and a clause on specialization are used by 79 and 83% of those 42 cartels. The correla-
tion between the two is negative (-0.23) but statistically insignificant (p-value 0.14). 
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tioning the production of goods,17 whereas the latter has no (direct) impact on produc-
tion, only on distribution. The cartels using Non-competition/specialization are not the 
standard textbook cartel because, after implementation, often only one of the parties 
remains active. Despite this we feel that it is justified to regard these as cartels as first, 
the transaction ensures that joint profits can be maximized and as second, the contracts 
almost invariably include non-competition clauses where the party ceasing production is 
not allowed to re-enter, nor to sell its knowledge to third parties.  
ICC – Incentive Compatibility Constraint 
The second economic dimension of the contracts, ICC, consists of different contractual 
ways of dealing with the incentive compatibility constraint. We looked for four ways of 
dealing with this problem. The variable Monitoring takes value one if the contract has a 
clause on how the members monitor each other. As an example, the plywood cartel had 
a clause whereby “all information on sales, deliveries and production must be given to 
the Association twice a month; twice a year a certified auditor's statement of the cor-
rectness of previous notifications is required”. Enforcement takes value one if the con-
tract stipulates how to handle situations where a member has deviated. Such instances 
include the mention of price wars of some type, retaliation, and compensations. An ex-
ample is the clause used by the glass cartel: “The delegation has the right to order pro-
duction reductions or temporary closing of a plant. Compensation must then be paid”. 
The variable Expel takes the value one if the cartel has rules on how to expel a member 
if rules are broken. Similarly, the variable Fine takes the value one if the contract in-
cludes a clause on monetary fines for a company that violates the contract. Fines were 
usually either a percentage of some measurable activity (like sales), or a  minimum fine 
in monetary terms was defined. 
                                                 
17 As an example, as part of a cartel on the production of bicycle parts, one of the parties agreed to cease 
production of certain bicycle parts. 
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ICO – Internal Cartel Organization 
The third economic dimension of cartel contracts, ICO, is about the internal organiza-
tion of the cartel and is captured by five measures. The variable Meeting takes the value 
one if the contract stipulates whether, and if so, how often, the members are to meet. 
Dispute-resolution in turn takes the value one if the contract specifies a way in which 
disputes among members are to be resolved. There were two primary ways in which 
disputes resolution was specified in the contracts: either an internal mechanism, or an 
external mechanism (court, arbitration).   Structure takes the value one if the cartel has a 
formal structure such as an association or a limited liability company to organize itself. 
Vote is a variable that takes the value one if a voting procedure is specified in the con-
tract.18 Finally, Sales association takes the value one if the cartel has formed either a 
trade or a sales association. 
ECC – External Cartel Contract 
The fourth and final economic dimension of cartel contracts, ECC, has to do with how 
the cartel deals with outsiders and external threats. We searched for three contractual 
characteristics: the New members -variable takes the value one if the contract specifies a 
policy on how to accept new members. Non-cartel supply indicates whether or not the 
cartel members have a clause on how to deal with supply from non-member rivals. Fi-
nally, Entry takes value one if the contract stipulates how to react to entrants into the 
industry. 
 In the rest of the paper, we systematically make use of these four dimensions, d ∈ 
{MPA, ICC, ICO, ECC} to organize the contracts and to sketch their anatomy. 
                                                 
18 Those cartels that use the ICO clause Vote often specify the voting rules:  Voting power is distributed 
according to (sales) quotas or sales (billing), using the 1-share-1-vote-rule, as relative to wages paid, or as 
a function of the size of the members. As an example, the cardboard cartel used the following voting rule: 
“Voting power is based on production (volume)”. 
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3.4 Descriptive statistics of MPA, ICC, ICO and ECC 
We present the first descriptive statistics in Table 1. The panel on the L.H.S. reports 
figures for the extensive margin, i.e., how prevalent it is for a given cartel to have at 
least one clause covering economic dimension d in its contract. As can be seen, almost 
all cartels (105 out of 109, or 96%) include at least one contractual measure in the MPA 
dimension, i.e. on how to increase profits.19 This prevalence is probably not very sur-
prising given the objective of cartels: they must agree on at least one way to increase the 
joint profits of their members. 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
There is much more variation in the ICC, ICO and ECC dimensions. About half 
(52%) of cartels have one or more contractual clauses for ICC, which are designed to 
deal with the incentive compatibility constraint. This is relatively low percentage, at 
least relative to the amount of attention that the economic literature has devoted to the 
incentive compatibility of cartel agreements. A high percentage (85%) of cartels has at 
least one contractual clause designed to detail cartel organization (i.e., in the ICO di-
mension). Finally, some three quarters (73%) of cartels went through the trouble of tak-
ing into account external threats (ECC) in their contract.  
The panel on the R.H.S. of Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on the intensive 
margin, which here refers to the fraction of all possible contractual clauses (that we con-
sider) that cartels use in a given economic dimension of the contract, conditional on 
usage. Thus, the first row tells us that those cartels that include at least one MPA-related 
clause in their contract use on average 30% (i.e., roughly two out of the six possible) 
clauses to specify how profits are to be increased. The fraction of clauses in the ICC 
dimension, conditional on usage, is 40% out of four possible clauses. Those cartels that 
                                                 
19 Of the four who do not have an MPA clause, two are in publishing, one in pharmaceuticals, and the last 
in jewelry/goldsmith products. For the pharmaceuticals cartel, agreeing on how to raise profits was prob-
ably unnecessary given that the industry was heavily regulated (including prices), although one could 
think that they could have used a Non-competition/specialization clause for example. 
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contractually specify something about how the cartel is organized use roughly half of 
the available five measures. Finally, we find that cartels use, on average, less than half 
of the three contractual clauses available (identified by us) to deal with external threats.  
In sum, Table 1 is consistent with cartels economizing on contracting and adopt-
ing an incomplete contracting approach. Cartels appear to use the four economic dimen-
sions selectively. Further, the intensity of usage is not particularly high in any of the 
four economic dimensions, suggesting that a few contractual clauses in a given econom-
ic dimension are deemed enough. However, this does not mean, say, that the 48% of 
cartels not using an ICC clause would not have taken care of the incentive compatibility 
of their cartel arrangement. It may merely mean that they found the costs of using an 
explicit contractual clause for the incentive compatibility higher than the benefits such a 
clause would bring. It is also possible that other dimensions of the contract made having 
an explicit incentive compatibility clause unnecessary.20  
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
Table 2 takes a first shot at shedding light on the question of how popular the dif-
ferent types of contracts are. Before moving to the analysis where we look at the 18 
contract clauses, we here consider a cartel contract to be a four-tuple {MPA, ICC, ICO, 
ECC}, where each element takes the value 1 if the contract of a cartel has at least one 
contractual clause that belongs to the corresponding economic dimension d (i.e., the 
extensive margin). We call a specific combination of the different contracting dimen-
sions a contract type and note that there are at most 15 distinct contract types that we 
                                                 
20 The cement cartel in the data may serve as an example: the two firms agreed on geographical market 
allocation. Given the locations of their production facilities, this may have made the use of explicit incen-
tive compatibility clauses unnecessary as (apart from maybe at the border of their allocated regions), the 
only way to cheat on the contract on a large scale would be to open a production facility in the other 
firm’s territory. This of course would be easy to verify. 
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could observe.21 As the first column of the table reveals, only ten contract types can be 
identified from our data. The second and third columns show, in turn, that 39% (42 out 
of 109) cartels use the most popular contract type and 27% (29 out of 109) the second 
most popular one. The distribution of contract types is thus skewed. Indeed, 90% of the 
cartels use one of the five most common contract types, as spanned by the four econom-
ic dimensions. We easily reject the null hypothesis of cartels randomly covering some 
combination of the four economic dimensions 
As the panel displaying the extensive margins shows, the most popular contract 
type is the one where each of the four economic dimensions is covered. Somewhat sur-
prisingly, given the emphasis economic research has put on the incentive compatibility 
conditions of cartels, the second most popular contract type covers all other dimensions 
but the ICC dimension. The three most popular contract types which are chosen by 73% 
(80 out of 109) of the cartels are all fairly comprehensive, covering at least three of the 
four economic dimensions.  
 The last columns of Table 2 show the intensive margins of the contract types (i.e., 
the fractions of the various contractual clauses in economic dimension d that are used in 
each contract type). When we look at the intensive margin of covering the different 
economic dimensions we find, on the one hand, surprisingly little variation over the 
contract types. On the other hand, we find − as we already inferred from Table 1 − that 
intensity of usage is not particularly high in any of the four economic dimensions, sug-
gesting that a few contractual clauses in a given economic dimension are deemed 
enough. This is especially true if we concentrate on the five most common contract 
types. 
                                                 
21 This means that we view the cartels as having the choice of choosing any of the 15 possible combina-
tions of economic dimensions available to them. We exclude the possibility of not choosing any – this 
would result in there not being a contract. Note that the space of the contract types is conditional on the 
number of underlying metrics. That is, here the potential space is defined by the four economic dimen-
sions: 24 − 1 = 15. 
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In sum, the descriptive statistics of Table 1 and 2 show that almost all contracts 
have at least one profit (MPA) clause, making it – unsurprisingly – a fundamental build-
ing block of cartel contracts. However, we observe that there is a lot of concentration 
(only a small fraction of all potential contract types is used) and that cartels use the re-
maining three economic dimensions – ICC, ICO and ECO – quite selectively. This 
means that there is a lot of potentially interesting heterogeneity in how cartels deal with 
instability. Taken together, these features of the contract data suggest that we should 
take a closer look at the MPA, i.e., how cartels try to raise profits and, in particular, 
whether this choice has implications to the rest of the contract.  
4 Analysis of contract structure 
This section starts with the most fundamental issue: How do cartels choose to raise 
profits? If we observe a pattern in this, the next step is to relate this pattern with the var-
ious ways in which the cartels solve instability issues.  
4.1 How do cartels raise profits? 
We start by taking a look at how prevalent the various MPA clauses are (Table 3) and at 
their unconditional correlations (Table 4).  
 Table 3 shows that Pricing, Market allocation, Non-competition/specialization 
and Technology are more common than Efficiency and Non-price clauses in our sample. 
Table 4 shows, in turn, that out of these more common clauses, Pricing is negatively 
(and mostly significantly) correlated with the other, more common MPA clauses. Mar-
ket allocation is not correlated the other more common clauses. Finally, Non-
competition/specialization and Technology are positively correlated.22  
[TABLES 3 AND 4 HERE] 
                                                 
22 Of the 63 cartels using Pricing, 22% use also Market allocation and 10% Non-
competition/specialization; of the 29 cartels using Market allocation, 48% use Pricing and 41% Non-
competition/specialization; and of the 42 cartels using Non-competition/specialization, 14% use Pricing 
and 29% Market Allocation. 
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 These patterns suggest the existence of three MPA-driven contracting approaches 
− as we will call them henceforth. The three contracting approaches are built around the 
most prevalent MPA clauses, with their cores referring to Pricing (often together with 
Non-price), Market allocation and the amalgam of Non-competition/specialization and 
Technology, which are highly correlated with each other (we will refer to this amalgam 
as Non-Comp-Tech). This view is strengthened when one compares the use of Pricing, 
Market allocation and Non-competition/specialization to the use of the other three MPA 
clauses. Of the 105 cartels that use at least one MPA clause, 99% (=104/105) use at 
least one of Pricing, Market allocation and Non-competition/specialization, whereas 
only 47% (= 49/105) use at least one of the remaining three.  
 Seen this way, we find that that while all cartels agree on some mechanism to 
raise joint profits, they largely use three different approaches that appear to be substi-
tutes. As we will show below, the data indeed support this emerging anatomy: it can be 
found also via a graphical cluster analysis (see below) and once we condition on ob-
servable cartel characteristics. Perhaps as importantly, we find that choosing any one of 
the three most prevalent MPA clauses has implications to the rest of the contract. This 
means that there appears to be three main contracting approaches that cluster around the 
most prevalent MPA clauses. 
4.2 How do cartels deal with instability? 
Table 5 explores whether the various clauses via which cartels try to deal with instabil-
ity are systematically associated with the MPA clauses. This we do by displaying the 
unconditional correlations of the various MPA clauses both with the three economic 
dimensions (ICC, ICO and ECC) and also with the individual clauses of which they 
consist.  
 Focusing on the extensive margin w.r.t. ICC, ICO and ECC, it seems that the 
three MPA contract types have a particular correlation structure with the rest of the con-
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tract. Pricing and Market allocation are positively correlated with the use of ICC and 
ICO and negatively, or not at all, with the use of ECC. The amalgam Non-Comp-Tech, 
on the other hand, is negatively correlated with the use of ICC and ICO but positively 
with the use of ECC. The unconditional correlations of the various MPA clauses with 
the individual clauses of ICO, ICC and ECC reveal more heterogeneity, but are broadly 
consistent with these patterns.23 These findings imply that choosing one of the (more 
common) three MPA clauses has implications to the rest of the contract. This leads to 
the three basic contracting approaches to which we alluded above.  
[TABLE 5 HERE] 
To check that the findings that we have documented so far are not an artifact of 
how we have approached the data, we change the level of analysis and go from the four 
economic dimensions to the 18 contract clauses. This means that the size of the space of 
possible contract types now grows to 262 143 (= 218 − 1).  
 Before we take a graphical look at how the data are clustered in the larger con-
tracting space, we make three observations. First, it turns out that in our data, only 77 
unique contract types can be observed in the larger 18-dimensional contracting space. If 
anything, this confirms that only a small fraction of all potential contract types is used 
and, thus, that there is concentration and clustering in the data. Second, the most popu-
lar contract type in the space of 18 contract clauses is used by 8% (9/109) cartels. In line 
with the analysis along the four economic dimensions, it spans all four of them. The 
second most popular contract type spans three of the four economic dimensions and is 
                                                 
23 To be more precise, the table shows the following: i) Pricing is correlated positively and significantly 
with ICC clauses Monitoring and Expel; positively with the ICO clauses Structure, Vote and Association, 
but negatively with Dispute; and negatively with the ECC clauses Non-cartel supply and Entry but posi-
tively with New members. It is worth pointing out that the positive correlation between Pricing and Moni-
toring is in line with the stylized facts underpinning the model of Harrington and Skrypacz who highlight 
that the cartels they study agree on prices, and have a monitoring scheme. ii) Market allocation is posi-
tively correlated with three of the four ICC clauses (Monitoring, Enforcement, Fine), but only with one 
ICO clause (Dispute) and one ECC clause (Non-cartel supply). iii) Non-competition/specialization on the 
other hand is negatively correlated with all four ICC clauses. It is also negatively correlated with three 
ICO clauses (Structure, Vote, Association), and positively with one (Dispute). In the ECC dimension, it is 
negatively correlated with New members, but positively with the other two. 
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used by 5% (5/109) of the cartels. Again, in line with our previous results, but surpris-
ingly given the existing literature, it contains no ICC clauses.24 Defining contracts to be 
close when they differ in at most the use of two clauses, we find that 31% (34/109) of 
the cartels use one of the two most popular contracts, or contracts close to them. Finally, 
the most complicated contract uses 78% of the contract clauses (i.e., 14 out of 18) on 
which we collected information. On the other hand, the simplest ones use only one of 
the MPA clauses.25 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
Figure 1 displays the contract data in a three-dimensional graph. The columns are 
the 77 contract types observed in the data and the rows the 18 contract clauses. Thus by 
taking a column and reading the rows one can find out what clauses that particular cartel 
contract uses. The height refers to the number cartels that use a given contract clause 
combination. The figure confirms the existence of three basic contracting approaches. 
Two of them are easier to identify from the graph: the group of contracts that use Pric-
ing cluster in the South-East corner and the group of contracts that are associated with 
the amalgam of Non-Comp-Tech clusters in the North-West corner. The third group that 
                                                 
24 We can also look at how many contracts are “one step” away from the two most popular contracts in 
that they use at most one additional clause, or at most one fewer clauses. It turns out that there are three 
cartels that use a contract type that is otherwise similar to the most popular contract type, but utilizes one 
more ICO clause. When we look at contract types that are one step away from the second most popular 
contract, we find two. They both utilize one clause less (either Technology or Non-cartel supply) and are 
both used by two cartels. We define being “two steps away” similarly: Two contracts are at most two 
steps away from each other if either contract i uses all the clauses that contract j uses, and at most 2 oth-
ers; or i uses all but one of the clause that j uses, and at most one other. 
25 The cartel with 14 clauses was a joint sales organization of plastics manufacturers. The four clauses this 
cartel did not use are Non-price, Monitoring, Meeting and Entry. The six cartels with only one clause are: 
a cement cartel that used Market allocation (geographic territories); a cartel on manufacturing of bicycle 
parts (Non-competition/specialization); a cartel on steam boiler production (Pricing); a cartel on manufac-
turing of metallic construction items (Pricing); a cartel on manufacturing of leather bags and other leather 
apparel (Pricing); and a cartel on manufacturing of made-up textile goods except wearing apparel (Pric-
ing). 
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uses Market allocation is harder to identify visually, as it is more scattered across the 
contracting space.26 
4.3 Summary 
In sum, we find that that all cartels agree on some mechanism to raise joint profits, but 
use different approaches. The most commonly used MPA-clauses appear to be substi-
tutes. Perhaps as importantly, we find that choosing any one of the three most prevalent 
MPA clauses has implications to the rest of the contract. Thus, there appears to be three 
main contracting approaches that cluster around the most prevalent MPA clauses. 
5 Contract heterogeneity  
In this section we study how observable cartel- and industry characteristics, such as the 
size of cartels and product homogeneity/differentiation, correlate with the design of car-
tel contracts. We do it in two ways. First, we consider the observable determinants of 
the 18 contractual clauses. Second, we redo the correlation analysis of the previous sec-
tion to check the extent to which the unconditional correlation structure between the 
various contract clauses can be explained away by the observables.  
5.1 Observable heterogeneity in contract anatomy  
We report here results from Probit models where the dependent variables are the four 
economic dimensions and the 18 contractual clauses of which they consist. These esti-
                                                 
26 The figure can be reproduced by using cluster analysis, though the match is not perfect. Cluster analysis 
typically suggests the existence of three clusters, though this depends somewhat on the method of cluster-
ing. Another way to identify the contracting clusters is to condition on, say, Pricing and to ask what the 
most popular contracts (that use this clause) are and what other clauses such contracts have in common. 
One can also explore how many contracts are “one step away” from the most popular contract that uses 
Pricing. Doing this would result in a picture very similar to Figure 1.  
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mations allow us to directly study how the use of a certain contract clause is associated 
with observable industry and cartel characteristics.27  
 The key explanatory variables are the number of cartel members and the indicator 
that measures product differentiation (homogenous_d) in the industry.  We also control 
for other industry characteristics and the state of the macroeconomy at the time of writ-
ing the contract. The industry characteristics are the gross value of production (GVP), 
the (raw) material cost divided by GVP, the ratio of blue-collar hours to GVP, and the 
number of plants in the industry, all measured at the 4-digit industry classification of the 
cartel. All industry variables are measured one year prior to the cartel registering. We 
include the following macro variables: HP-filtered GDP and positive and negative 
shocks to GDP.28 By using these three variables we can separately identify the effect of 
the level of GDP, and of positive and negative shocks to GDP, on cartel contracts. We 
also include the year of registration to capture unobserved time-specific determinants of 
cartel contract design.29 The estimations use a sample of 107 cartels, as we lack infor-
mation on the number of members for two cartels.30 
                                                 
27 We estimate individual probits instead of following the standard discrete choice approach (e.g. McFad-
den and Ruud 2000) of treating the different potential cartel agreements as different “products” in a 
choice set, from which each cartel chooses the one that maximizes its utility. The main reason is the size 
of the choice set (relative to the number of cartels we observe). An auxiliary reason is that in that ap-
proach we should include into our sample industries without cartels. As registration was not compulsory 
we cannot be sure that an industry without a registered cartel did not actually have one. In Hyytinen, 
Steen and Toivanen (2011) we study the determinants of cartel births and deaths with a model that takes 
this ignorance into account. 
28 Detrending was done using a smoothing index of 100. Note that both deviations are defined in absolute 
terms. 
29 For 12 industries, we miss one or the other industry characteristic. We then use an imputed value, 
which is the predicted value of the 4-digit value, the prediction taken from a regression of the 4-digit 
value of the industry characteristic on the 2-digit value, measured in the same year. For those couple of 
observations where we lack the 2-digit information, we use the 4-digit mean. We include a separate 
dummy (replace_d) for these observations in all but those equations where the outcome variable has no 
variation conditional on replace_d taking value one (or zero). Our results are robust to excluding the 
observations with missing industry characteristics.  
30 These are both Pricing cartels, one in shoe manufacturing, the other in manufacturing of furniture. 
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 Tables 6 and 7 present the average marginal effects for cartel size and the homog-
enous industry dummy for the MPA clauses and the ICC, ICO, EEC clauses, respective-
ly.31  
[TABLES 6 and 7 HERE] 
Cartel size 
Out of the six MPA clauses, only one (Market allocation) is not significantly correlated 
with cartel size. Four of the significant marginal effects are negative, and only Pricing is 
positively correlated with cartel size. Interestingly, cartel size is differently associated 
with the three, most commonly used MPA clauses: Market allocation is uncorrelated, 
Pricing positively correlated and Non-Comp-Tech negatively associated with cartel size. 
This suggests that the way in which a cartel decides to increase profits and, by implica-
tion, its chosen contracting approach, is related to the number of cartel members.32 
Turning to the instability clauses, we find (from the R.H.S. of Table 6) that the ex-
tensive margin of the three economic dimensions (ICC, ICO, ECC) are significantly and 
positively affected by cartel size. As Table 7 shows, the picture is somewhat richer at 
the level of individual clauses.33 
                                                 
31 The marginal effects for the macro- and industry heterogeneity controls are for brevity presented in 
Tables A3 and A4 in the Appendix. 
32 The median number of members using Pricing is also larger (7) than those using either Non-Comp-
Tech (2) or Market allocation (3). (See Table A1). 
33 To be more concrete, we find the following: The marginal effects of cartel size for clauses on internal 
cartel organization (ICO) are either significantly positive (3), positive (1) or very close to zero (1), clearly 
suggesting that cartel size is positively correlated with the use of organizational ICO clauses. For ICC and 
ECC the disaggregated effects are of both signs and thus more difficult to interpret, but the results suggest 
that the predominant aggregate effect is that the use of instability clauses is positively correlated with 
cartel size. 
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Product differentiation 
The homogenous goods-dummy is significantly positively associated with the use of 
two of the six MPA clauses (Table 6): Market allocation is more likely and the Efficien-
cy clause less likely to be used by cartels in homogenous goods industries.34  
 We find that the homogenous goods-dummy is positively associated with the ex-
tensive margin of ICC, ICO and ECC (Table 6). However, only the last (ECC) is statis-
tically significant. This nevertheless suggests marginally increased usage in homoge-
nous industries. Echoing this, we find from Table 7 three statistically significant posi-
tive marginal effects and no negative and significant ones: one of the positive and sig-
nificant marginal effects is for an ECC clause (Entry), while the other two are for ICC 
clauses (Monitoring, Enforcement). 
Macro- and industry heterogeneity  
While not reported here (see the Appendix, Tables A3 and A4, for details), it is worth 
pointing out two things about how industry characteristics and macroeconomic varia-
bles are associated with the four economic dimensions. First, both industry characteris-
tics and macro variables primarily affect use of profit (MPA) rather than instability 
(ICC, ICO, ECC) clauses.35 Second, there are some clear differences among the most 
common MPA clauses: Market Allocation is not much affected by industry and cartel 
                                                 
34 Moreover, we see from from Table A1 that as many as 77% of the Market allocation cartels are found 
in homogenous goods industries, but only 33% of the cartels choosing Efficiency are in homogenous 
goods industries. 
35 Of 52 MPA parameters, 25 are significant, whereas only 32 out of 130 instability clause-parameters are 
significant. More generally, the most significant industry characteristics are gross value added (gvp) and 
material share divided by gross value added (material share). Of the seven significant gvp parameters, 
five are positive suggesting increased contract clause usage with increased gvp. Of the seven significant 
material share parameters, five are negative suggesting that as (inverse) productivity increases, contract 
clause usage is (reduced) increased. The most significant macro controls are the shock variables. The 
marginal effect from positive shocks are negative in five out of eight significant cases, whereas for nega-
tive shocks six out of eight significant marginal effects are positive.   
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heterogeneity, Pricing is sensitive to macro shocks, and Non-Comp-Tech is correlated 
with changes in both macro- and industry heterogeneity.36 
5.2 Unobservable heterogeneity in contract anatomy 
Here we redo the correlation analysis of the previous section (i.e., Tables 4 and 5) by 
studying the matrix of correlation coefficients between the generalized residuals of the 
estimated Probit models. This conditional correlation analysis allows us to check the 
extent to which the unconditional correlation structure between the various contract 
clauses can be explained away by the observables. 
 The correlations of the generalized residuals are displayed in Table 8. We have 
two main findings. First, the relationship across the MPA clauses stays more or less the 
same when we compare these correlations to the unconditional ones in Tables 4. Sec-
ond, the relationship between the MPA clauses and the instability clauses changes. The 
unconditional correlations (reported earlier in Table 5) told us that there was a pattern 
across each of the three most commonly used MPA clauses and the instability clauses. 
Now this pattern mostly disappears or gets weaker. In particular, the correlation be-
tween MPA clauses and ECC and ICC disappears.37 The relationship between ICO and 
the MPA clauses are also weakened, but not by as much. It is important to note that 
when we exclude the number of members and homogenous_d from the Probit specifica-
tions, the correlations between the generalized residuals are again close to the uncondi-
tional correlations.  
[TABLE 8 HERE] 
                                                 
36 Market Allocation is significantly positively correlated with gross value added only, and Pricing is 
significantly decreasing in both GDP shocks and the HP trend but correlated only with one industry char-
acteristics (plants). For Non-Comp-Tech three of the four macro-shock parameters come in significant 
and positive and five out of eight industry characteristics’ parameters are significant. Of the three MPA 
contract types, only Pricing is affected (positively) by the year of entering the Registry. 
37 Looking at the relationship between MPA and the instability clauses (individual clauses and extensive 
margins) we find for ECC that 13 of the 24 unconditional correlation coefficients were significant, now 
only seven are significant. For ICC were the number of significant correlations is reduced from 13 to five 
out of 30. Finally, while 18 of 36 the unconditional correlations between MPA and ICO were significant, 
the number is now reduced to 14. 
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To be a bit more specific, we find that after conditioning, i) Pricing is no longer 
correlated with ICC, ICO and ECC;38 ii) the Market allocation contract clause correla-
tions do not change much, mirroring the finding that Market Allocation contracts were 
less affected by industry- and macro heterogeneity than the two other more commonly 
used MPA clauses;39 and iii) Non-competition/specialization is still negatively correlat-
ed with ICO, but is not correlated with ICC and ECC anymore.  
5.3 Summary 
Summing up the results on observed heterogeneity we find that the size of the cartel is 
associated with the choice of how to raise profits, being positively correlated with the 
use of Pricing, negatively with the use of Non-Comp-Tech, and uncorrelated with Mar-
ket Allocation. Market Allocation is positively correlated with the cartel operating in a 
homogenous goods industry. Cartel size and being in a homogenous goods industry are 
both (mostly) positively associated with the use of instability clauses in ICC, ICO and 
ECC.  
The relationship between the three most commonly used MPA clauses is robust to 
cartel-/industry heterogeneity and business cycle conditions. However, the relationship 
between the three most commonly used MPA clauses and the instability clauses gets 
weaker. It is thus the observables, in particular the number of members and the homog-
enous goods -dummy, that drive many of the unconditional correlations. 
 Although our results are correlations instead of causal results, one may want to 
speculate about the mechanisms bringing them about. The positive correlation between 
                                                 
38 After conditioning on observables, Pricing is significantly correlated with no ICC, three ICO (negative-
ly with Dispute, positively with Vote and Association) and one ECC clause (negatively with Non-cartel 
supply) whereas without conditioning it was correlated with two out of four ICC, four out of five ICO and 
all three ECC clauses. 
39 The positive correlations between Market allocation and ICC and ICO clauses are actually strength-
ened in terms of statistical significance. Note also that now all ICC clauses and two additional ICO claus-
es (Vote, Structure) positively and significantly correlate with Market allocation in addition to Dispute. 
Note though that the sizes of those correlations that were significant without conditioning are slightly 
decreased. 
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Pricing and cartel size may be explained by the fact that large cartels would find it 
harder to e.g. allocate markets than agree on prices; similarly, coming up with ways of 
avoiding competition through specialization may become increasingly hard as the num-
ber of members increases, along the lines discussed in the literature on endogenously 
incomplete contracts. A possible reason for the correlation between Market Allocation 
and the homogenous goods -dummy could be that it is easier to divide markets (e.g. 
geographically) when the product is homogenous.40 Another potential explanation for 
the positive correlation could be that many homogenous goods industries sell to other 
firms instead of consumers. In such markets prices aren’t necessarily observed, making 
coordination on prices harder to monitor.41 
6 Complexity and stability of contracts 
While the above results already speak to the variation in the complexity of contracts, we 
have not explored complexity directly. In this section we first regress the complexity 
and stability of cartel contracts on a set of cartel and industry variables. We then study 
three cartels in more depth and find that these analyses support our earlier findings.  
6.1 Regression analysis 
We employ two measures of “complexity”: the number of clauses used by the cartel, 
and the length of the contract, measured in pages.42 Our measure of contract stability is 
the number of times the cartel registered a change of contract with the Registry. This 
measure is related to contract complexity and mirrors how stable the contracts were 
                                                 
40 This could be so as when buyers have heterogenous tastes, allocating markets among producers of 
differentiated products leads to a reduction in the choice set of individual customers, and thereby to re-
duced social surplus (and firm profits). 
41 In such circumstances it may be easier to monitor an agreement on market allocation. Supporting the 
latter argument, transport costs may play a bigger role in many homogenous goods markets (as customers 
have no reason to pay a premium for their most preferred product), making (geographic) market alloca-
tion more attractive as the opportunity cost of “giving” up more distant customers to a fellow cartel mem-
ber is lower than in a differentiated goods industry. 
42 Taylor (2007) also applies the number of pages as a measure of complexity in his study of the cartel 
codes from the National Industrial Recovery Act. 
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from a contracting point of view, i.e., how the characteristics of the cartel, the initial 
contract, and the environment at the time the initial contract was registered affect the 
number of times the contract was changed.  
 Table 9 presents eight Poisson regressions that shed light on the complexity of 
cartel contracts. There are three dependent variables in the table: the number of clauses 
in a contract, the number of pages of the contract and the number of contract changes.43 
The explanatory variables include the number of members and the homogenous goods, 
as well as the same industry and macroeconomic variables as used in the Probit models 
earlier. In addition to these, we include the MPA clause indicators and the extensive 
margin for the instability clauses (ICC, ICO and ECC) in some of our regressions.44 
[TABLE 9 HERE] 
Table 9 generates three main findings. First, the number of clauses is positively 
correlated with the number of members, suggesting that large cartels have more com-
prehensive and complex contracts (columns 1 and 2). The number of pages is also posi-
tively correlated with the number of members, but this coefficient becomes insignificant 
when we include controls (columns 3, 4 and 5). A potential explanation for the positive 
association between contract complexity and number of members is that an increase in 
the number of members raises the cost of relying on informal agreements as opposed to 
relying on formal contract (clauses). Second, the degree of product differentiation is not 
correlated with the number of clauses, but we do find that cartels in homogenous goods 
industries have shorter contracts.45 While not entirely conclusive, these findings could 
be explained by homogenous goods industries having less need to contract on product 
characteristics and quality. Third, we find that cartels using Pricing and Market Alloca-
                                                 
43 The distributions of the number of clauses and the number of contract changes are presented in Table 
A6. The mean number of contract clauses (pages, contract changes) is 5.60 (3.32, 1) and the standard 
error 2.48 (1.99, 1.40). 
44 The control variable coefficients are tabulated in Table A6 in the Appendix. 
45 None of the industry- and macro characteristics are significant (Table A6, column 2). 
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tion contracts write longer contracts.46 Cartels using ICC and ICO clauses also have 
longer contracts.47 
Turning then to columns 6, 7 and 8 of Table 9, we find that the number of contract 
changes seems initially positively correlated with both cartel size and the homogenous 
goods-dummy. These results however disappear when we include controls. Pricing car-
tels have significantly more contract changes and Non-Comp-Tech cartels fewer con-
tract changes. The first result is not entirely surprising, as some of the contract changes 
are about changes of prices. Market Allocation cartels are no different from the other 
MPA contract types.  
Looking at the industry- and macro controls in Table A5 we find that both the 
GDP level (HP-trend) and positive macro shocks (at the time of registering the cartel) 
affect the number of contract changes positively. This suggests that cartels that are 
formed during a boom experience more contract changes during their lifetime. (See Ta-
ble A5, column 8). 
6.2 Case studies  
In this sub-section we provide short case studies of three cartel contracts: one Pricing, 
one Market allocation, and one Non-comp-Tech cartel case. Our choice rule was to 
choose the earliest registered cartel in a homogenous goods industry that uses (only) one 
of the three aforementioned MPA clauses. This resulted in us presenting here the match 
producers cartel (Case #1), the cement cartel (Case #2), and the plywood box cartel 
(Case #3).  
                                                 
46 This corresponds with the median length of contracts (Table A1): Pricing and Market Allocation con-
tracts have medians of three and four pages respectively; the Non-Comp-Tech contracts a median of two 
(Non-competition/specialization) or three (Technology). 
47 The business cycle movements seem to matter in that the coefficient of HP-trend is significant and 
negative. One should note however that there is also a positive trend through the positive significant ef-
fect from the registry birth parameter (Table A6 column 5). 
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 It turns out that all these cartels used relatively short and simple contracts. This is 
consistent with the above regression results, as they all have a small number of mem-
bers and are in homogenous goods industries. 
Case #1: The match producers cartel 
Finnish match producers formed a pricing cartel as early as 1927. The cartel consisted 
of an informal (unregistered) association and the Match Industry’s Price Committee, as 
it was called. All Finnish match producers participated in this collaborative effort, but 
the number of members appears to have varied a little over time; at the time of the cartel 
was registered, it had 7 members (see below). The cartel agreed on prices, discounts to 
wholesale customers and cash purchases. It also agreed on the size of match boxes, and 
on prices of different labels on the boxes, and therefore also Non-price takes values one. 
The cartel also decided that the contract would continue on a calendar year basis unless 
some of the parties discontinue it. As the original contract contained no further issues on 
which the cartel agreed, all the remaining 16 clauses are given value zero. When the 
cartel was contacted by the Registry in 1961, they stated as the objective the “organiza-
tion of domestic sales of matches”. They also announced some changes to the earlier 
agreement that had to do with the pricing of different labels. The organizational form 
changed in 1971 when the Finnish Match Association was formed – thus the value of 
Structure would have changed from zero to one in 1971.48 The Association took over 
the duties of the Price Committee. The cartel continued to fix prices, but now also had a 
written contract which is 3.5 pages long. The contract lists the members, states that 
there is to be an annual meeting, and has rules on voting and exit. Moreover, the con-
tract has a clause on dispute resolution; in case of a dispute the members would resort to 
arbitration by the Finnish Chamber of Commerce. All of these are features included in 
                                                 
48 Recall that in our data we have coded the clauses in the original contract or the contract in place at the 
time of registration. Thus the clauses added in 1971 for the match producers do not enter our data.  
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our data. The final correspondence between the cartel and the Registry is in 1986. A 
member of the cartel has sent a letter stating that the Finnish Match Association has not 
had any activities “for a number of years”. The Registry therefore decides to remove the 
cartel from the Registry as of 1986.  
The match producers cartel is an example of a relatively small pricing cartel in a 
homogenous goods industry. They got by for more than 40 years with a relatively sim-
ple and informal organization, and by only using a few clauses. What is notable is that 
they did not agree on any type of monitoring at any point, not even in 1971 when they 
changed for a much more formal organization and added several clauses to their con-
tract. 
Case#2: The cement cartel 
The cement cartel is an example of a market allocation cartel in a homogenous goods 
market. The two Finnish cement producers’ cartel was registered in 1959. The firms 
announced that they had agreed to divide Finland geographically, with the smaller firm 
(whose market share was given as 35%) concentrating on the area that in the south was 
round the capital Helsinki, and which extended to the north to a couple of municipalities 
(called Haapajärvi and Vieremä; see map in the Appendix). The production facility of 
the smaller member was located (in 1959) west of Helsinki in the town of Lohja. Both 
to west and east of this area, as well as north of it was the designated area of the larger 
member (with market share of 65%). The reason for this particular split of the market 
was the location of production facilities. The larger competitor had in 1959 a production 
facility in the south-eastern town of Lappeenranta, which allowed it to service eastern 
Finland with the lowest possible transportation costs (as lake transport was readily 
available). The other production facility of the larger member was in 1959 in the south-
west town of Parainen on the coast. This location allowed relatively cheap sea transport 
to the northern port of Oulu and thereby northern Finland was allocated to this mem-
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ber.49 The firms also produced quicklime with 1959 market shares of 20-50% for the 
larger firm and 20-40% for the smaller, depending on the type of quicklime.  
 There was further correspondence between the Registry and the cartel in 1966. 
The cartel declared that no essential changes in their operation had taken place, but noti-
fies the Registry that in parts of southern Finland both producers’ cement is offered. The 
declared market shares were now “circa 64%” and “circa 35%”. There is further corre-
spondence in 1979. Now the declared market shares are “circa 64%” and “32-36%”, 
which is indicative of a stable arrangement. The larger cartel member states in its letter 
that “the marketing areas of cement are determined by customer choices, driven largely 
by transport costs”. This cartel has the simplest contract observed by us, as they only 
agreed on geography-based market allocation.50  
Case #3: The plywood box cartel 
Two manufacturers of plywood boxes made an agreement in 1964 whereby one of them 
ceased the production of these products altogether. It also committed itself to not re-
enter the business for 15 years, and to neither sell nor allow the use of its machinery. 
Also, it committed to not reveal its knowhow of plywood box production to any domes-
tic competitor. We therefore coded this cartel to use two more clauses besides Non-
competition/specialization: Non-cartel supply and Entry. As compensation the firm con-
tinuing production promised to pay a royalty on its plywood box revenues to the firm 
ceasing production. In the correspondence with the Registry the firms stated that this 
agreement did not result in a monopoly,51 and also asked for the Registry not to publish 
the clause on royalties. In 1981 the Registry approached the firms and they declared that 
                                                 
49 Lohja, the town where the other member had its sole production facility, is not on the coast. 
50 It turns out that in separate contracts, given different entry numbers by the Registry, the two firms 
agreed on discounts with their downstream retailers. In effect, they ensured a price-cost margin to their 
retailers through these contracts without agreeing on a final price for their products.  
51 Unfortunately we could not establish the market shares of these two firms. 
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the contract had not been extended, and that also the other firm had ceased production 
of plywood boxes. The cartel was therefore removed from the Registry. 
6.3 Summary 
In sum, we find that smaller cartels use less complex contracts and that cartels in indus-
tries producing homogenous goods appear to write shorter contracts. In terms of con-
tract dynamics, contract changes are seen more often in Pricing cartels and less often in 
Non-Comp-Tech contracts. The cases support these results, as all the three case cartels 
use relatively short and simple contracts. The case studies thus support the view that in 
certain circumstances, even quite simple cartel contracts appear to be sufficient to sus-
tain collusion.  
7 Discussion 
In this section, we discuss briefly three issues: first, do our results generalize to beyond 
the sample of 109 manufacturing industries and cartels? Second, how do our results 
compare to what is known about cartel contracting in other institutional environments 
and countries? Third, we discuss the relationship between legal and illegal cartel con-
tracts. 
 Our analysis has focused on the 109 nationwide manufacturing cartels that were 
the first registered cartels in a given (3-digit) industry. To check how representative this 
sample is, we use more limited information from a larger sample of 902 legal cartels 
from the same era.52 This sample covers both manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
industries. The sample contains information on the use of Pricing, Market-allocation, 
and Non-competition/specialization. We find that 37% of the manufacturing cartels in 
the large sample use Pricing when the 58% of cartels in our sample do; 27% use Mar-
ket-allocation (27% in our sample) and 52% use Non-competition/specialization (39% 
                                                 
52 In the large data, 480 (345) out of 541 (361) manufacturing (other) cartels use at least one of these three 
clauses, i.e. 89% (96%). 
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in our sample). As in the smaller sample, these MPA-clauses are negatively correlated. 
The differences to the cartels outside manufacturing are larger: These use Pricing clear-
ly more often (78%), and Market-allocation and Non-competition/specialization less 
often than the manufacturing cartels (6% and 22%). There is thus a reason to think that 
non-manufacturing cartels use different contracts than manufacturing cartels, but that 
our sample seems representative of the larger sample. 
Our findings augment those of Suslow and Levenstein (2011): in their sample of 
international illegal cartels 81% use market allocation compared to 27% in our data. 
Note though that according Levenstein and Suslow (2011, Table 3), earlier studies look-
ing at legal cartels report numbers very similar to ours. Further, in Levenstein and 
Suslow’s sample, 72% of cartels use monitoring and 39% have a hierarchy where the 
comparable figures for us are 24% (Monitoring) and 42% (Structure). 29% of their car-
tels involve a trade sales association where for us the figure is 52%. Comparing the 
characteristics of the cartels in our sample to those studied by Harrington (2006) we 
find more heterogeneity. For example all cartels in Harrington’s sample agree on prices, 
and, though this is more difficult to judge, it seems cartels in Harrington’s sample used 
more complex organizations than the average cartel in our sample. The former could be 
the result of the international illegal cartels being unable to use market allocation as it 
could have lead to a higher detection probability. The latter may be explained by the 
very fact that international cartels need a more complex organization than national car-
tels. 
Our contract characteristics are not easily compared to those recorded by Taylor 
(2007). Our results on the complexity of cartel contracts are however in line with his, as 
Taylor also found, using data on U.S. legal cartels from the 1930s (the National Indus-
trial Recovery Act), a positive but insignificant correlation between size and number of 
pages, and no significant relationship between pages and degree of differentiation.  
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It seems clear that the need of illegal cartels to conceal their agreements and be-
havior will lead to further endogenous incompleteness of contracts, compared to legal 
cartels. From this point of view one could think that the contracts we’ve studied are the 
type of contracts illegal cartels would like to have, were it possible. This would mean 
that observed differences between contracts of legal and illegal cartels could be assigned 
to the competition law regime that the latter face. The reasoning behind this statement is 
that the profit, incentive and organizational issues illegal cartel face, as well as those 
relating to changes in the external environment, are similar to those faced by legal car-
tels.  
8 Conclusions 
We find that while essentially all cartels agree on some mechanism to raise joint profits, 
they differ in how they do this. By and large, we find three basic contracting approach-
es: cartels either agree on prices, allocate markets, or use some type of non-
competition/specialization clause to raise profits. These are substitutes. Choosing one of 
these has implications to the rest of the contract when considering the unconditional 
data. For example, unconditionally, the Market allocation cartels use more incentive 
compatibility (ICC) and organizational (ICO) clauses, whereas Pricing is positively 
correlated with ICC and ICO, but negatively with clauses on external threats (ECC). In 
contrast, the Non-Comp-Tech contracts are negatively associated with ICC, ICO and 
positively with ECC in the unconditional analysis.  
 These correlations are however largely explained by the number of members in 
the cartel, and the industry producing homogenous goods. To be more specific, we find 
that Pricing contracts are positively and Non-Comp-Tech contracts negatively associat-
ed with the number of cartel members, but Market allocation contracts are not affected 
by cartel size. In contrast, only Market Allocation is correlated (negatively) with the 
degree of product differentiation. The conditional analysis also shows that the correla-
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tion structure across the MPA clauses stays more or less the same (when compared to 
the unconditional one), but that the relationship between the MPA clauses and the insta-
bility clauses changes (becoming weaker, in general). Thus, taken together, one could 
argue that large cartels tend to agree on prices, cartels in homogenous goods industries 
raise profits by allocating markets, and small cartels agree to avoid competition through 
specialization. 
There are further differences: larger cartels use more complex contracts and car-
tels in industries producing homogenous goods appear to write shorter contracts. Pric-
ing and Market Allocation contracts are the most complex in terms of page length. In 
terms of contract dynamics, contract changes are seen more often in Pricing cartels and 
less often in Non-Comp-Tech contracts. We also find that cartels formed during an eco-
nomic boom write simpler (shorter) contracts, but subsequently have more changes to 
the contract. 
 What is clear is that cartel contract characteristics are systematically chosen, and 
that even legal cartels appear to economize on what clauses they use. It is unclear 
whether this is due to pre-contractual (and if so, of what type; see, e.g., Battigalli and 
Maggi 2008, Tirole 2009) or ex post costs. The observed contracts of (detected) illegal 
cartels are likely to be even more incomplete, because the contracting parties have a 
strong incentive to reduce the ability of a legal court to verify the contracted actions 
ness of observed cartel contracts; see, Kvaløy and Olsen (2009). How this endogenous 
contract incompleteness affects cartel formation and collusive behavior and the ability 
of competition authorities to detect them (and courts to make a ruling) deserves further 
scrutiny. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Usage 
  Extensive margin Intensive margin 
  
Number of 
cartels freq. # clauses freq. 
MPA 105 0.96 6 0.30 
ICC 57 0.52 4 0.39 
ICO 93 0.85 5 0.49 
ECC 80 0.73 3 0.43 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Extensive- and intensive margins for contract dimension usage 
 
        Extensive margin Intensive margin 
Contract 
Type n freq. homog. 
MPA 
usage 
ICC  
usage 
ICO 
usage 
ECC 
usage 
MPA 
usage 
intensity 
ICC us-
age 
intensity 
ICO 
usage 
intensity 
ECC 
usage 
intensity 
1 42 0.39 0.50 1 1 1 1 0.30 0.38 0.58 0.38 
2 29 0.27 0.48 1 0 1 1 0.32 . 0.39 0.46 
3 9 0.08 0.56 1 1 1 0 0.30 0.50 0.49 . 
4 9 0.08 0.11 1 0 1 0 0.33 . 0.36 . 
5 9 0.08 0.44 1 0 0 0 0.22 . . . 
6 4 0.04 0.25 1 0 0 1 0.29 . . 0.58 
7 3 0.03 0.00 0 1 1 1 . 0.33 0.73 0.44 
8 2 0.02 1.00 1 1 0 0 0.25 0.25 . . 
9 1 0.01 0.00 1 1 0 1 0.33 0.25 . 0.67 
10 1 0.01 0.00 0 0 1 1 . . 0.60 0.33 
 
 
Table 3. Prevalence of MPA clauses 
  Mean 
Variable All Homog. 
Non-
homog. 
pricing 0.578 0.525 0.646 
market allocation 0.266 0.131 0.438 
efficiency 0.083 0.098 0.063 
technology 0.284 0.344 0.208 
non price 0.147 0.115 0.188 
non comp spez 0.385 0.426 0.333 
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Table 6. Marginal effects of MPA contract clause and other economic dimension probit regressions 
  pricing 
market 
allocation efficiency  technology 
non 
price 
non comp 
spez ICC ICO ECC 
log(members) 0.066** -0.070 -0.102** -0.109*** -0.069** -0.156*** 0.262*** 0.186*** 0.146*** 
  (0.032) (0.043) (0.046) (0.037) (0.030) (0.055) (0.043) (0.057) (0.042) 
homogenous_d 0.027 0.219*** -0.118** -0.059 -0.040 -0.028 0.120 0.021 0.128** 
  (0.065) (0.066) (0.060) (0.070) (0.064) (0.089) (0.095) (0.058) (0.056) 
Observations 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 
NOTES: The numbers presented are marginal effect and (s.e.).***, **, and * refer to statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% lev-
els.  
 
 
Table 4. Unconditional correlations of MPA clauses
pricing market 
allocation
efficiency technology non price
market allocation -0.116 1
efficiency -0.216** 0.272*** 1
technology -0.532*** 0.082 0.180* 1
non price 0.302*** 0.044 -0.124 -0.147 1
non comp spez -0.698*** 0.035 0.310*** 0.546*** -0.222**
NOTES: ***, **, and * refer to statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels.
Table 5. Unconditional correlations between MPA clauses and other economic dimensions 
  pricing 
market 
allocation efficiency technology 
non 
price 
non comp 
spez 
ICC 0.236** 0.448*** 0.022 -0.151 -0.002 -0.368*** 
  monitoring 0.173* 0.443*** -0.012 -0.114 0.011 -0.266*** 
  enforcement 0.085 0.483*** 0.198** -0.044 0.087 -0.175* 
  expel 0.215** -0.002 -0.058 -0.117 -0.111 -0.289*** 
  fine 0.09 0.279*** -0.030 -0.089 0.048 -0.169* 
ICO 0.317*** 0.226** 0.05 -0.236*** -0.012 -0.370*** 
  meeting_new -0.014 0.121 0.152 -0.115 -0.124 0.036 
  dispute -0.357*** 0.339*** 0.233** 0.278*** 0.001 0.304*** 
  structure 0.316*** 0.074 -0.054 -0.251*** -0.145 -0.371*** 
  vote 0.436*** 0.082 -0.070 -0.284*** 0.042 -0.412*** 
  association 0.486*** 0.076 -0.047 -0.334*** 0.137 -0.565*** 
ECC -0.293*** 0.086 0.028 0.293*** -0.111 0.263*** 
  new 
  member 0.395*** -0.082 -0.095 -0.406*** -0.055 -0.500*** 
  non cartel supply -0.529*** 0.212** 0.155 0.587*** -0.032 0.561*** 
  entry -0.380*** -0.015 -0.030 0.313*** -0.099 0.417*** 
NOTES: ***, **, and * refer to statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels.  
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Table 7. Marginal effects of ICC, ICO and ECC contract clauses 
  ICC ICO ECC 
 
monit enf. expel fine meeting dispute structure vote assoc. new 
 member 
non cartel 
supply 
Entry 
log(members) -0.049 -0.058** 0.294*** -0.019 -0.004 0.010 0.273*** 0.220*** 0.115** 0.219*** -0.131*** -1.470*** 
  (0.031) (0.024) (0.036) (0.022) (0.015) (0.022) (0.040) (0.050) (0.052) (0.033) (0.043) (0.197) 
homogenous_d 0.181*** 0.083** -0.046 -0.040 -0.053 0.053 -0.100 -0.027 -0.110 -0.089 0.078 0.142*** 
  (0.044) (0.041) (0.065) (0.058) (0.056) (0.090) (0.076) (0.057) (0.100) (0.064) (0.069) (0.047) 
Observations 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 
NOTES: The numbers presented are marginal effect and (s.e.). ***, **, and * refer to statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels.   
 
 
 
  
Table 8. Correlations of generalized residuals of MPA clauses and other economic dimensions 
  Pricing 
market 
allocation efficiency  technology 
non 
price 
non comp 
spez 
  market allocation -0.231** 1.000 
   
  
  efficiency -0.075 0.255** 1.000 
  
  
  technology -0.256*** 0.214** 0.050 1.000 
 
  
  non price 0.214** -0.041 -0.060 0.024 1.000   
  non comp spez -0.359*** 0.080 0.178* 0.269*** -0.159* 1.000 
ICC -0.019 0.327*** 0.048 0.061 0.005 -0.133 
  monitoring 0.030 0.334*** 0.048 -0.027 -0.021 -0.102 
  enforcement 0.020 0.395*** 0.048 -0.027 -0.021 -0.102 
  expel -0.136 0.195** 0.021 0.134 0.061 0.080 
  fine 0.051 0.283*** -0.019 -0.016 0.059 -0.097 
ICO 0.062 0.185* 0.097 -0.090 -0.025 -0.303*** 
  meeting_new 0.138 0.063 0.185* -0.156 -0.076 -0.104 
  dispute -0.321*** 0.223** 0.109 0.241*** 0.040 0.102 
  structure 0.135 0.198** 0.116 -0.056 -0.209** -0.207** 
  vote 0.221** 0.181* 0.168 -0.036 0.047 -0.186* 
  association 0.192** 0.072 0.063 -0.026 0.087 -0.265*** 
ECC -0.124 0.248*** -0.023 0.132 0.026 0.085 
  new 
  member 0.139 -0.043 0.072 -0.192** 0.060 -0.215** 
  non cartel supply -0.201** 0.285*** -0.005 0.387*** -0.003 0.225** 
  entry -0.019 -0.042 -0.084 0.044 -0.109 0.044 
NOTES: ***, **, and * refer to statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels. 
  
 47 
 
Table 9. Contract com
plexity and stability
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
VARIABLES
#clauses
#clauses
#pages
#pages
#pages
#changes
#changes
#changes
log(m
em
bers)
0.086***
0.097***
0.132***
0.070
0.066
0.261***
0.075
-0.105
(0.018)
(0.025)
(0.042)
(0.057)
(0.089)
(0.082)
(0.139)
(0.143)
hom
og_d
0.106
0.065
0.019
-0.172**
-0.198**
0.437**
0.145
0.042
(0.084)
(0.076)
(0.074)
(0.077)
(0.085)
(0.176)
(0.224)
(0.261)
pricing
-
-
-
0.349**
0.242*
1.271***
1.197***
(0.151)
(0.126)
(0.461)
(0.446)
m
kt_allocation
-
-
-
0.333***
0.340***
0.241
0.272
(0.123)
(0.114)
(0.290)
(0.354)
efficiency
-
-
-
0.186
-0.046
1.038***
1.410**
(0.119)
(0.132)
(0.399)
(0.606)
technology
-
-
-
-0.049
-0.157
0.196
0.118
(0.110)
(0.125)
(0.314)
(0.452)
non_price
-
-
-
0.197
0.144
-0.511
-0.892**
(0.129)
(0.123)
(0.326)
(0.421)
non_com
p_spez
-
-
-
-0.026
0.021
-1.130**
-1.398**
(0.111)
(0.104)
(0.559)
(0.624)
ICC_1
-
-
-
0.176**
0.164*
0.220
-0.231
(0.088)
(0.090)
(0.323)
(0.350)
ICO
_1
-
-
-
0.130
0.268*
-0.214
0.079
(0.153)
(0.138)
(0.337)
(0.423)
ECC_1
-
-
-
-0.058
-0.072
-0.346
-0.215
(0.137)
(0.133)
(0.288)
(0.219)
Controls
N
o
Yes
N
o
N
o
Yes
N
o
N
o
Yes
O
bservations
107
107
107
107
107
107
107
107
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix Tables 
 
Table A1. Conditional medians/means of cartel characteristics     
Conditioning 
variable members duration 
  pag-
es homogenous goods #contract_changes #clauses 
All 4 5 3 0.44 1 6 
MPA 4 5 3 0.457 1.029 6 
Pricing 7 2 3 0.492 1.524 6 
market alloca-
tion 3 5 4 0.724 1.138 8 
Efficiency 2 5 4 0.333 0.889 7 
Technology 2 5 3 0.322 0.452 5 
non price 4 1.5 4 0.556 0.938 6.5 
non comp spez 2 5 2 0.381 0.286 5 
ICC 7.5 5 3 0.491 1.333 7 
ICO 5 5 3 0.441 0.968 6 
ECC 4 5 3 0.45 0.863 6 
NOTES: the numbers presented are the medians of the     
 column variables, conditional on the row variable taking      
the value one for all but homogenous goods and #contract changes, for which we report the mean 
 
 
  
Table A2. Unconditional correlations of available                                                                                                                            
MPA clauses for all cartels (n=902)
pricing                   
market 
allocation
non comp 
spez
All cartels
pricing 1
market allocation -0.147*** 1
non comp spez -0.488*** -0.089*** 1
Manufacturing cartels
pricing 1
market allocation 0.034 1
non comp spez -0.624*** -0.334*** 1
Other cartels
pricing 1
market allocation -0.131*** 1
non comp spez -0.226*** 0.003 1
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Table A3. Marginal effects of MPA contract clause and other economic dimension probit regressions
pricing market 
allocation
efficiency technology non price non comp 
spez
ICC ICO ECC
log(members) 0.066** -0.070 -0.102** -0.109*** -0.069** -0.156*** 0.262*** 0.186*** 0.146***
(0.032) (0.043) (0.046) (0.037) (0.030) (0.055) (0.043) (0.057) (0.042)
homogenous_d 0.027 0.219*** -0.118** -0.059 -0.040 -0.028 0.120 0.021 0.128**
(0.065) (0.066) (0.060) (0.070) (0.064) (0.089) (0.095) (0.058) (0.056)
hp_trend -0.566** -0.300 -0.290 -0.036 0.021 -0.112 0.718 0.029
(0.247) (0.418) (0.222) (0.300) (0.297) (0.342) (0.448) (0.262)
gdp_neg -0.882** 0.165 0.423* 0.832*** -1.722*** 1.523*** 0.239 -0.018 1.073**
(0.394) (0.571) (0.220) (0.244) (0.401) (0.498) (0.504) (0.329) (0.474)
gdp_pos -0.547* -0.289 -0.126 1.118*** -0.546*** -0.013 0.187 -1.017** 1.585***
(0.307) (0.303) (0.185) (0.188) (0.150) (0.246) (0.250) (0.471) (0.576)
mat. share -0.087 -0.361 0.339** -0.365** -0.242* 0.439** -0.169 -0.446* -0.216
(0.264) (0.275) (0.145) (0.156) (0.130) (0.217) (0.283) (0.238) (0.297)
hours -0.034 0.017 -3.572* 0.176*** -0.188** 0.169*** -0.095* 0.072 0.029
(0.079) (0.083) (1.872) (0.066) (0.088) (0.057) (0.054) (0.100) (0.067)
gvp 0.011 0.025*** 0.006 0.008 -0.007 -0.030** 0.034 -0.002 -0.008
(0.011) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.012) (0.021) (0.005) (0.011)
plants -0.084** -0.039 0.011 0.008 -0.027* 0.073 -0.094 0.061 0.067
(0.037) (0.055) (0.024) (0.013) (0.016) (0.050) (0.069) (0.052) (0.043)
reg. birth 0.118* 0.072 -0.012* 0.087 -0.014 0.027 0.025 -0.148 0.010
(0.065) (0.113) (0.006) (0.062) (0.075) (0.074) (0.090) (0.112) (0.072)
replace_d 0.822*** 0.062 1.183* 0.122 -0.931*** 0.468 -0.604* -0.708**
(0.254) (0.392) (0.631) (0.115) (0.317) (0.471) (0.338) (0.304)
Observations 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 107
NOTES: The numbers presented are marginal effect and (s.e.).
***, **, and * refer to statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels. 
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Table A4. Marginal effects of ICC, ICO and ECC contract clauses
monit. enf. expel fine meeting dispute structure vote assoc. new
 member
non 
cartel 
supply
entry
log(members) -0.049 -0.058** 0.294*** -0.019 -0.004 0.010 0.273*** 0.220*** 0.115** 0.219*** -0.131*** -1.470***
(0.031) (0.024) (0.036) (0.022) (0.015) (0.022) (0.040) (0.050) (0.052) (0.033) (0.043) (0.197)
homogenous_d 0.181*** 0.083** -0.046 -0.040 -0.053 0.053 -0.100 -0.027 -0.110 -0.089 0.078 0.142***
(0.044) (0.041) (0.065) (0.058) (0.056) (0.090) (0.076) (0.057) (0.100) (0.064) (0.069) (0.047)
hp_trend -0.093 -0.446** -0.403 0.001 -0.102 -0.585** 0.260 0.686** -0.140 -0.130 -0.228 -0.768**
(0.359) (0.223) (0.265) (0.305) (0.182) (0.290) (0.313) (0.271) (0.345) (0.371) (0.260) (0.372)
gdp_neg -0.339 -0.165 0.495 -0.168 0.195 0.935** -0.257 -0.275 0.474 0.044 0.654** -0.417
(0.671) (0.276) (0.340) (0.370) (0.270) (0.440) (0.540) (0.488) (0.434) (0.399) (0.302) (0.259)
gdp_pos -0.219 -0.418 0.513** -0.019 -0.589** -0.467 -0.579 -0.692 -0.360 -0.149 1.684*** 0.167
(0.385) (0.373) (0.228) (0.343) (0.258) (0.515) (0.432) (0.437) (0.371) (0.353) (0.395) (0.210)
mat. share -0.222 -0.314** 0.085 -0.151 -0.235 -0.357 -0.385* -0.143 -0.298 -0.148 -0.169 0.019
(0.311) (0.124) (0.239) (0.244) (0.162) (0.326) (0.226) (0.279) (0.360) (0.204) (0.204) (0.210)
hours 0.099*** 0.034 0.030 0.030 0.073 -0.046 -0.171 -0.211 -0.142 -0.079 0.072 -0.010
(0.035) (0.059) (0.088) (0.081) (0.072) (0.092) (0.137) (0.156) (0.117) (0.099) (0.090) (0.196)
gvp 0.043*** 0.019*** -0.018* 0.016** 0.010** 0.011 -0.031** -0.014 0.005 0.003 -0.013 -0.007
(0.009) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.005) (0.012) (0.015) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.005)
plants -0.025 -0.012 -0.076** -0.020 -0.119* -0.021 -0.015 -0.026 -0.038 -0.050** 0.049* 0.007
(0.030) (0.013) (0.035) (0.021) (0.064) (0.039) (0.019) (0.030) (0.050) (0.020) (0.028) (0.007)
reg. birth 0.008 0.105* 0.118 -0.009 0.035 0.179** -0.064 -0.187** 0.010 0.030 0.076 0.222**
(0.095) (0.059) (0.072) (0.082) (0.050) (0.082) (0.086) (0.074) (0.089) (0.098) (0.073) (0.108)
replace_d 0.449** -0.197 0.159 0.361 -0.089 -0.481** 0.164*
(0.195) (0.318) (0.182) (0.309) (0.373) (0.201) (0.089)
Observations 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 107
NOTES: The numbers presented are marginal effect and (s.e.).
***, **, and * refer to statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels. 
ICC ICO ECC
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Table A5. Correlations of generalized residuals of contract clauses
m
oni 
toring
enforcem
ent
expel
fine
m
eeting
dispute
structure
vote
associati
on
new
 m
em
ber
non 
cartel 
supply
Entry 
ICC
0.472***
0.492***
0.287***
0.634***
-0.022
0.289***
-0.022
0.238
0.141
0.052
0.159
0.02
enforcem
ent
0.2459**
1
expel
-0.0556
-0.0148
1
fine
0.2705***
0.5614***
0.0321
1
ICO
0.004
0.267*
0.118
0.129
0.155
0.180*
0.358***
0.371***
0.261***
0.260***
0.033
0.037
m
eeting
0.1721*
-0.1298
0.0203
-0.0177
1
dispute
0.1978*
0.228**
0.1358
0.2565**
-0.1932*
1
structure
-0.2255**
0.0514
0.3299***
0.0628
-0.0182
0.0736
1
vote
-0.0445
0.084
0.3362***
0.2027**
0.0488
0.1389
0.6082***
1
association
-0.1196
0.1898*
0.2201**
0.177*
0.0067
0.1568
0.5367***
0.5788***
1
ECC
0.194**
0.271**
0.282***
0.377***
-0.024
0.267**
0.254***
0.303***
0.254***
0.348***
0.457***
0.516***
new
 m
em
ber
-0.162
-0.0244
0.2898***
0.0374
-0.0594
0.1235
0.5163***
0.6199***
0.5983***
1
non cartel supply
0.0711
0.0599
0.1137
0.1068
-0.0715
0.2153**
0.0291
0.0306
-0.0237
-0.1285
1
entry
0.0683
0.0852
-0.128
0.0208
-0.0826
-0.0535
-0.0835
-0.1039
-0.1339
-0.0645
0.1944*
1
N
O
TES: ***, **, and * refer to statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10%
 levels.
ICC
ICO
ECC
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Table A6. Contract com
plexity and stability
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
VARIABLES
#clauses
#clauses
#pages
#pages
#pages
#changes
#changes
#changes
hp_trend_t_1
-
-0.247
-
-
-1.440**
-5.023**
(0.429)
(0.592)
(2.281)
gdp_neg_t_1
-
0.504
-
-
0.676
3.332
(0.647)
(0.588)
(3.224)
gdp_pos_t_1
-
-0.102
-
-
0.478
5.957**
(0.293)
(0.491)
(3.022)
m
aterial_share4
-
-0.422
-
-
-0.253
-1.069
(0.289)
(0.402)
(0.909)
hoursbc_gvp4
-
-0.007
-
-
-0.145
-0.820**
(0.122)
(0.137)
(0.384)
gvp4_t_1d
-
0.009
-
-
-0.007
0.004
(0.007)
(0.010)
(0.017)
plants4_t_1
-
-0.022
-
-
0.012
0.159
(0.024)
(0.066)
(0.104)
reg_birth
-
0.067
-
-
0.363**
1.124**
(0.117)
(0.154)
(0.544)
d_replace
-
-0.010
-
-
-0.044
-2.089**
(0.253)
(0.607)
(0.952)
Constant
1.518***
-129.368
0.950***
0.631***
-704.566**
-0.725***
-0.763
-2,182.120**
(0.074)
(227.157)
(0.108)
(0.129)
(300.158)
(0.258)
(0.561)
(1,056.670)
O
bservations
107
107
107
107
107
107
107
107
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A7. The distribution of #clauses and # contract changes
# cartels
count clauses  contract changes
0 - 58
1 6 17
2 5 19
3 10 11
4 16 3
5 15 0
6 21 0
7 15 0
8 9 0
9 5 1
10 4
11 1
12 1
13 0
14 1
Note: column two 
displays the number 
of cartels with a 
given number of 
clauses (as given in 
column 1). Column 
three displays the 
number of cartels 
with a given 
number of contract 
changes
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Figure 1
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Figure A1. Entry and cumulative entry into the Registry  
 
Figure A2. Exit and cumulative exit from the Registry  
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Figure A3. Map of market allocation and location of plants of the cement cartel in 
1959. 
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